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COMMEJ\JT: THE Cft-'"SE FOR REAL 
SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY 
George Dentt 
We have now had two excellent presentations of opposing views. 1 
In order to continue to build on this success, I will try to give a pro-
vocative idea here. Craig White did an able job of taking on Lucian 
Bebchuk from one side of the continuum. What I will do-and, Pro-
fessor Bebchuk, if you think this is unfair, well, that's just tough-! 
am going to take you on from the other side. 
I agree with Professor Bebchuk that our corporate governance sys-
tem now is flawed, that many boards of directors are heavily influ-
enced or dominated by the CEO so that the company is not managed 
with the goal of maximizing shareholder wealth. I also agree with 
him that more shareholder input into the election of directors would 
improve things, but that the reforms recently enacted or proposed do 
not go far enough in this direction. 
We have heard statements from a couple of speakers today to the 
effect that most boards are doing a good job. Most boards have im-
proved, and are trying to do the right thing; I am not going to question 
that. But that seems to me like saying, "Most people don't engage in 
armed robbery, so why do we need laws against armed robbery?" In 
a minority of companies, boards are still not doing a good job. In 
several recent cases catastrophes struck corporations, and boards were 
not there to prevent this from happening. It is unrealistic to think that 
conditions have changed so that the same thing could not possibly 
happen again today. I am confident that there are some boards where 
the same thing could happen. But I am not sure Rule 14a-112 would 
t Schott-Vanden Eynden Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of 
Law. 
1 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access: A Response to the Busi-
ness Roundtable, 55 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 557 (2005); Craig Owen White, Corporate Govern-
ance: Directors v. Shareholders?, 55 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 569 (2005). 
2 Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. 60784-01 (proposed Oct. 23, 
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even help prevent such incidents. Professor Bebchuk admits that any 
benefits from the rule would be small. 
We have heard references to some of the rule's detriments this 
morning: disruption and diversion of company personnel to deal with 
more frequent election contests, deterrence of the best candidates 
from serving as directors because life is going to be unpleasant on 
boards, and balkanization of boards into hostile factions. I think those 
supposed detriments have been exaggerated by the critics. But if the 
rule has even small detriments, they still outweigh its benefits because 
those benefits will be paltry. Professor Bebchuk has said in defense 
of Rule 14a-11 that even if it does not bring much improvement, its 
lack of success could justify consideration of more expansive reforms 
of corporate elections; people will come back and say we need to go 
farther down that road. 
I am not sure that would happen. First of all, pro-management 
forces will be saying-and we have already had a hint of this in some 
comments this morning-that we should take more time to see if 
these reforms work. Of course, "more time" turns out to be basically 
forever. Second, the failure of Rule 14a-11 could weaken the enthu-
siasm of investors for more shareholder involvement in elections. In 
other words, if 14a-11 produces no benefits, the reaction may not be 
that we need to go farther in the same direction. Rather, investors 
may lose hope for efforts to strengthen shareholder democracy. 
Furthermore, as I mentioned before, the enthusiasm for reform 
ebbs and flows. At most times there is little impetus for reform. We 
have now a window of opportunity. If we let that window shut with-
out doing anything substantial, it may be a long time before it opens 
again. 
I am not suggesting, though, that we abandon efforts for more 
shareholder input. Quite the contrary, I offer what will be to Profes-
sor Bebchuk, I hope, a friendly challenge, and to Mr. White what will 
be more of a provocation, and that is to consider an alternative that is 
bolder and yet quite simple. 
I propose that the nomination of the corporation's official slate of 
directors be removed from the incumbent board, which is often pas-
sive and dominated by the CEO, and be given instead to a committee 
consisting of the ten to twenty largest shareholders. These sharehold-
ers should seek directors who strive to maximize shareholder wealth. 
Choosing different directors is not, however, the primary objec-
tive. As Professor Bebchuk and others have suggested, independence 
2003) (to be codified at 17 C.P.R. 240.14a-11). 
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in the sense of a lack of conflicts of interest is no guarantee of effec-
tive board performance. The more important goal is to change the 
incentives of directors. As a behavioral psychologist would say: The 
question is not so much who sits on the board, but what is their 
schedule of reinforcement? There was mention earlier today of a 
conference directed by Jay Lorsch at Harvard. He has said that too 
many directors feel that they serve at the pleasure of the CE0.3 Di-
rectors who were selected by the shareholders would strive to serve 
the shareholders, even if they were the same people who are serving 
on the board now. 
Right now there is a lot of pressure on directors to go along with 
the CEO. If you do not feel like doing that, what do you do? You do 
not fight. You either do not talce the position to begin with, or you 
say, "This is not fun, I don't want to serve on this board any more." 
If the same people were really chosen by the shareholders, their in-
centive would be to serve the interests of shareholders. It is not really 
again a question of whether they are independent, or unaffiliated. It is 
a question of where the incentives are. 
But would directors so chosen serve special interests of the larger 
shareholders? This is a criticism we always get of shareholder pri-
macy, but it is highly improbable. Professor Bebchuk touched on this 
in connection with 14a-11, and I think the same thing is true of my 
proposal. Any special interest would have to be shared by a majority 
of the largest shareholders. It is hard to imagine such a situation aris-
ing. Besides, the committee I envision would only nominate direc-
tors. If the nominees seem committed to special interests, if by some 
unimaginable scenario all the official nominees were beholden to the 
company's labor union, other shareholders would have an incentive to 
run and elect an opposing slate. 
Would directors chosen by shareholders overemphasize short-term 
performance? It is a common criticism that investors are only con-
cerned about short-term performance. It is hard for me to imagine 
that the largest shareholders would communicate to directors that they 
want the board to focus on next quarter's earnings. 
Even if the largest shareholders did that, the directors would have 
an incentive to ignore them so as not to offend shareholders who are 
concerned about shareholder wealth. Lots of directors serve on many 
boards. How do you get a reputation for being a good director so that 
you will be invited to serve and remain on other boards? Today, you 
at least have to get along with the CEO because the selection process 
3 lAY W. LORSCH &ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES 17 (1989). 
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is heavily influenced by the CEO. The CEO typically has a veto over, 
or actually dominates, the selection of directors. 
Now imagine a world in which the selection of directors was 
dominated by shareholders. Even if you came under pressure from 
some of your own shareholders in a particular company to focus on 
the short-term, you would have to think, "Wait a second. If I do that 
and the company's fortunes briefly flare and then fizzle, is that going 
to enhance my reputation as a director?" 
If instead you enhance share value, lots of investors will be im-
pressed and want you to sit on the boards of their companies. So it is 
unlikely that directors chosen by shareholders would focus on the 
short -term at the expense of prudent, patient capital. 
Would directors chosen to serve shareholders mistreat other con-
stituencies? That too is unlikely. 
First, what are the interests of the other constituencies? True, for 
an employee of an unprofitable plant it is better that the company 
keeps running that plant, even if it means the company may go bank-
rupt in a few years, rather than shut it down today. 
But, in general, employees, customers, suppliers, and the commu-
nities in which companies operate tend to benefit themselves from the 
efficient operation of the corporation. Generally, the companies that 
are the most profitable grow the most rapidly, and the companies that 
grow the most rapidly are likely to increase employment, wages, and 
benefits. So in the long run, employees' interests are very little dif-
ferent from, if not identical to, the shareholders' goal of maximizing 
shareholder wealth. 
The criticisms of shareholder primacy seem to me to be wealc 
One possible response is to ask if one can guarantee that this or that 
parade of horrors will not occur under my proposal. Of course, the 
answer to that is no; one never can. Human institutions are always 
imperfect. Recall Churchill's comment about democracy: It is the 
worst form of government except for all the others that have ever 
been tried. 
Just as democracy is imperfect, shareholder primacy will be imper-
fect because directors, investors, and executives are human beings. 
The proper question is not, "Is it perfect?" The proper question is, 
"Compared to what?" We should compare shareholder primacy with 
the current system in which most boards are heavily influenced, if not 
dominated, by the CEO. 
I noted the objection that shareholder primacy leads to domination 
by special interests. Well, managers have their own special interests, 
and there is plenty of evidence that they use their influence now to 
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advance those interests. Professor Bebchuk has done studies about 
excessive compensation. We have seen in the last ten or twelve years 
that executive compensation exploded without any justification in 
managers' performance that I am aware of. 
Another current problem is empire building, as when CEOs devote 
corporate resources to unprofitable acquisitions or to other unpromis-
ing projects. As for concern for other constituencies, CEOs have no 
reason to treat them better than shareholders would, and there is no 
evidence that they do so now. 
As for short-term focus, we have already seen plenty of that with 
pump and dump schemes by executives who exaggerate earnings and 
then sell their stock at artificially inflated prices. It would be a lot 
harder for the ten to twenty larger shareholders to pull a stunt like 
that. So even if you are less sanguine than I am about the idea of 
shareholder control, it is hard to argue that it would be worse than 
CEO domination is now. 
You all know the story of the economist who is walking with a 
student. The student says, "Professor, that looks like a $20 bill on the 
street. Shall I pick it up?" The economist says, "Don't be silly. If it 
really were a $20 bill, somebody would have already picked it up." 
Well, if this idea I am putting forth is so great, why didn't some-
body else already think of it? Why hasn't some state tried to chal-
lenge Delaware by adopting this law? Why don't investor groups 
push it? As for the states, occasional efforts by other states to take 
franchise business away from Delaware have invariably failed. 
First of all, Delaware has a big advantage to start with just in hav-
ing a fully fleshed out, well known statute. For any state to compete 
it would have to offer a law that was not just marginally but dranlati-
cally better than Delaware's. And if some state did that, Delaware 
would just move its law in the same direction and regain its initial 
advantage from superior judicial competence and familiarity. So, 
whatever benefits there might be in what I am suggesting, it is highly 
unlikely that North Dakota could attract a huge number of franchise 
fees by adopting it. 
As for investors, they have the same collective action problem 
with respect to legislation that they have now in voting. Suppose 
TIAA-CREF or some other institutional investor waged a big cam-
paign to improve corporate governance. TIAA-CREF is a big outfit, 
but it still owns just a tiny fraction of all American stock. So its share 
of any benefit from better corporate governance would also be small, 
and proportionately no greater than any other investor's gain. There 
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really is not much incentive for any particular investor to knock itself 
out to change the system. 
That does not mean, though, that shareholders are taking abuses 
lying down. Bob Monks claims that excessive executive compensa-
tion alone exacts a tax of ten percent on investors, and that, to escape 
this mistreatment, investors are fleeing to private equity.4 Why? 
Well, venture capitalist and leveraged buyout firms do participate 
actively in choosing directors, and this participation does not seem to 
result in mistreatment of other constituencies, subjection of the port-
folio company to special interests or excessive focus on short-term 
performance, or any of the other horrors conjured up by critics of 
shareholder primacy. 
In general, these firms are well managed and do not waste re-
sources on unprofitable undertakings. I realize that shareholder con-
trol is not politically viable right away, but I am an academic-! think 
ideas have consequences-and people who care about corporate per-
formance as a key element of the success of the American economy 
can get behind good ideas. I hope that eventually this proposal will 
be adopted. 
4 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Symposium on Corporate Elections, Harvard Law and Econom-
ics Discussion Paper No. 448, *17, at http://ssm.com/abstract=471640 (November 2003) 
(Comment of Robert Monks). 
